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W~engler v. Druggists' Mutual
Insurance Company: No More
Skirting the Issue of Sex
Discrimination in Workers'
Compensation Dependency Statutes
TERESA A. SAGGESE*
LAWSON A. COX, H**
On April 22, 1980, the United States Supreme Court in Wengler
v. Druggists' Mutual Insurance Co.' held that a provision of the
Missouri Workers' Compensation law which established a conclu-
sive presumption of dependency for widows, but which required
widowers to prove incapacity or dependency, ran afoul of the
Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
That decision reflected an already emerging national awareness
that the present-day social and economic fabric no longer fit the
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1. 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
outmoded statutory framework of an era of gender bias. Even
before the Supreme Court issued its mandate in Wengler, three
states had already abolished their similarly worded workers' com-
pensation dependency provisions as being violative of equal pro-
tection.2 This comment will explore the development of that
socio-economic coming of age and the subsequent repeal and revi-
sion of workers' compensation dependency provisions left in the
wake of Wengler and its precursors.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In the late 1960's, before sex discrimination was considered a vi-
able constitutional affront, widowers in several jurisdictions were
effectively foreclosed by statute from receiving dependency bene-
fits upon the work-related deaths of their breadwinning wives. 3
Correspondingly, working women faced with the prospect of an
untimely job-related death could not expect to find the same fu-
ture financial solace for their family that the workers' compensa-
tion scheme held out to their male co-workers.
An Illinois plaintiff in 1969 tried a novel approach to the di-
lerima in Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.4 Clarence Duley,
whose wife had died in a forklift accident on her job, pursued a
wrongful death claim against her employer, notwithstanding the
Illinois Workers' Compensation Act's exclusive remedy provision.
That provision barred employees subject to the Workers' Com-
pensation Act and their dependents from pursuing any other rem-
edies at law.5 Another section of the Act, the dependency
provision, required widowers, but not widows, to prove total de-
pendency in order to receive death benefits.6 Accordingly, the
2. Tomarchio v. Township of Greenwich, 75 N.J. 62, 379 A.2d 848 (1977); Arp v.
Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 395, 563 P.2d 849, 138 Cal. Rptr. 293
(1977); Passante v. Walden Printing Co., 53 A.D.2d 8, 385 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1976). See
notes 25-31 infra and accompanying text.
3. As late as 1975, 22 workers' compensation statutes had sex-based depen-
dency provisions: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisi-
ana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,
and West Virginia. See Localio, Presumption of Dependence in Workers' Compen-
sation Death Benefits as a Denial of Equal Protection, 3 WORKERS' COMPENSATION
L. REV. 517, 519 (1976). See note 40 infra.
4. 44 Ill. 2d 15, 253 N.E.2d 373 (1969).
5. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(a) (Smith-Hurd 1969).
6. The applicable provisions of the statute read as follows:
The amount of compensation which shall be paid for an accidental in-
jury to the employee resulting in death is:
(a) If the employee leaves any widow, child or children whom he was
under legal obligation to support at the time of his accident, a sum equal
to 9.25 times the average earnings of the employee, but not less in any
event than $10,250 and not more in any event than $18,000.
(b) If no amount is payable under paragraph (a) of this Section and
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widower-claimant argued that since he was not totally dependent
upon his wife for support and was, therefore, not a statutory de-
pendent for the purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act, then
the exclusive remedy provision of that Act was inapplicable in his
case, leaving him free to sue under a wrongful death theory of
recovery.
It was a creative attempt that nonetheless failed to sway the
court. The obvious flaw in such reasoning was that the jurisdic-
tion of the administrative workers' compensation forum and cov-
erage under the Workers' Compensation Act was grounded in the
deceased claimant, not in whoever might allege dependency. To
hold otherwise would subvert the exclusive remedy provision by
providing a vehicle whereby parties who did not meet statutory
dependency requirements could be given greater leeway to pur-
sue legal remedies than were available to statutorily recognized
dependents. 7 Clearly, such a result could bring to a halt the ma-
chinery of the workers' compensation scheme, which is premised
upon the employer's accepting vicarious liability for work-related
accidents without regard to fault in return for the worker's forego-
ing his traditional tort remedies.
Having failed to convince the court that he was entitled to pur-
sue a wrongful death claim, plaintiff Duley resorted to what was
then a fallback argument, that the statutory classification requir-
ing widowers to prove total dependency unreasonably discrimi-
nated according to sex. Unfortunately, it was an idea that had not
yet reached judicial fruition. The Supreme Court of Illinois up-
held the discriminatory classification as legislatively sound be-
cause it was based on a rational difference of situation existing in
the employee leaves any parent, husband, or child or children, who at the
time of accident were totally dependent upon the earnings of the em-
ployee, then a sum equal to 9.25 times the average annual earnings of the
employee, but not less in any event than $10,250, and not more in any
event than $18,000.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.7(a), (b) (Smith-Hurd 1969) (emphasis added). In 1973
the Illinois legislature amended the discriminatory classification by extending the
operation of paragraph (a) to widowers.
7. It is interesting to note that this approach had worked for the plaintiff in
Miller v. Hotel Savoy Co., 228 Mo. App. 463, 68 S.W.2d 929 (1934), but ostensibly
only because the exclusive remedy provision of the Missouri act contained the fol-
lowing exception: "[tihe rights and remedies herein granted to an employee, shall
exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his wife, her hus-
band .... at common law or otherwise, . . . except such rights and remedies as
are not provided for by this chapter." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.120 (Vernon 1965) (em-
phasis added).
the affected class. The court accepted as axiomatic that classifica-
tions "based upon the disparate earning power of men and wo-
men"8 were consistent with fourteenth amendment requirements.
In a bout of circular reasoning characteristic of the times, the
court declared that "[ilt is not unreasonable to compensate ac-
cording to one's sex, and we find it conforms most realistically to
the economic situation present in our society today."'
In 1971, the same provision of the Illinois statute again came
under attack in Holiday Inns of America v. Industrial Commis-
sion.'0 Paul Ross, whose wife had been shot during a robbery on
her employer's premises, fied a death claim which was denied be-
cause he had not proven total dependency on his wife's earnings.
Showing a heightened awareness of the statute's constitutional
infirmity, the Circuit Court of Logan County on certiorari found
the provision unconstitutional. However, on appeal, the Supreme
Court of Illinois reversed the circuit court and upheld the discrim-
inatory classification. While giving great deference to the legisla-
ture, the court at the same time provided a foreshadowing of
judicial rethinking by concluding:
The complaint of the claimant is not without force and arguably the legis-
lature ought to have allowed husbands to recover on a showing of less
than total dependency. However, we are not persuaded that it is for the
courts to say that the omission rendered the legislative schedule unconsti-
tutional. In designing the Act the legislature was not required, at the risk
of constitutional condemnation, to have provided for all eligible conditions
or for none.1 1
8. 44 Ill. 2d at 19, 253 N.E.2d at 375, citing Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591
(2d Cir. 1968). In Gruenwald, the plaintiff tried to argue that certain provisions of
the Social Security Act discriminated against males in the manner in which bene-
fits are computed at age 62. He asserted that the provisions violated the Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution. The Court decided that
the favorable treatment given to women was not unconstitutional due to the differ-
ences between the physical and economic capabilities of men and women. The ob-
jective sought by the classification was found to be to reduce this disparity.
Therefore, the provisions were upheld as a valid means to achieve that goal.
9. 44 Ill. 2d at 19-20, 253 N.E.2d at 375.
10. 48 Ill. 2d 528, 271 N.E.2d 884 (1971). The constitutionality of the Workmens'
Compensation Act was questioned since it did not allow widowers to recover for
the deaths of their wives unless they could prove they were totally dependent on
them for support. This was challenged as discrimination on the basis of sex since
all widows whose husbands were killed could recover under the Act. The court
did not agree with the challenge and ruled that "[a) classification will suffice as a
basis for legislation if such classification is based on a rational difference of situa-
tion or condition found to exist in the persons or objects upon which the classifica-
tion rests." Due to the differences between men and women, and since equal
protection has not generally been a bar to legislation based on sex, the court up-
held the Act. Id. at 530, 271 N.E.2d at 886.
11. Id. at 533, 271 N.E.2d at 887.
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II. THE CONVOLUTING OF Kahn v. Shevin-AMEUORATIVE
CLASSIFICATIONS VERSUS ARCHAIC AND OVERBROAD
GENERALIZATIONS
Since 1971, equal protection as a vehicle for eliminating discrim-
inatory classifications based on sex has gone into high gear. In its
infancy, this area of constitutional challenge created a hybrid
standard of judicial scrutiny. Not quite ready to relegate gender-
based discrimination to a suspect class, which would require
heightened judicial scrutiny to survive constitutional attack, the
Supreme Court cautiously applied a "rational scrutiny"
standard.12
In Reed v. Reed,13 the Court struck down as unconstitutional a
gender-based Idaho statute which established a preference for
the appointment of males as estate administrators. Administra-
tive convenience for the probate courts was discarded by the
Court as an insufficient justification for a preference based on sex,
since the classification did not bear a rational relation to the al-
leged purpose. Similarly, in Stanley v. Illinois,14 the Court held
that the statutory denial of fitness hearings for unwed fathers, but
not unwed mothers, was violative of equal protection.
Protection against sex discrimination reached a high-water
12. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 20-24
(1972). Professor Gunther made an analysis of how the Warren Court viewed
equal protection. According to him, the Court determined that a law would not vi-
olate equal protection if the prescribed means were necessary and less drastic
means were not available to achieve that statutory purpose. The Court, through
restricting the legal means available, sought to protect interests it saw as funda-
mental. There must be a rational means-ends relationship to some valid public
purpose with the means being a necessary way to accomplish that goal. Gunther
mentioned laws affecting classifications such as race and speech freedoms as be-
ing those which the Burger Court would be most likely to scrutinize in that same
manner, but he did not mention the classification of sex, and predicted that the
Burger Court would probably not expand the list of suspect classes.
13. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The Court ruled that the Constitution does not bar dif-
ferential treatment of classes, but that equal protection does "deny States the
power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a stat-
ute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective
of that Statute." Preferring males to females in the administration of an estate
was not held to bear a "rational relationship to a state objective." Id. at 75-76.
14. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The Illinois statute was held to violate the fourteenth
amendment since it did not allow children to be taken from a divorced parent or
unwed mother without going through neglect proceedings; but an unwed father
could be denied the custody of his illegitimate children without a fitness hearing.
The father did not receive equal protection of the laws due to the state's failure to
give him the same hearing which would have been given to a female or a divorced
male parent.
mark in Frontiero v. Richardson,15 where four Justices applied a
strict scrutiny standard to invalidate a federal statute requiring
husbands of servicewomen, but not wives of servicemen, to prove
dependency before receiving certain military benefits. However,
the tide of judicial opinion has since receded to the middle-tier
standard set forth in Craig v. Boren16 and reiterated most re-
cently in Wengler v. Druggists' Mutual Insurance Co.; that gender-
specific classifications are permissible only when they further im-
portant governmental objectives and are substantially related to
the achievement of those objectives. Applying that level of scru-
tiny, the Supreme Court has increasingly struck down statutes
which create "archaic and overbroad generalizations" about
women.17
Anti-gender discrimination fervor was tempered, however, in
1974, by an emerging divergent rationale which upheld so-called
"ameliorative" statutes purportedly enacted to redress women for
past discrimination. In Kahn v. Shevin,18 the Supreme Court up-
held a Florida annual $500 real estate tax exemption for widows,
relying on median income statistics that justified a state tax law's
15. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The inequity that was challenged in Frontiero was that
a serviceman could declare his wife dependent for purposes of receiving benefits
whether she was or not, but a servicewoman had to prove her husband was depen-
dent on her for more than one-half of his support. Congress tried to rationalize
this law by concluding that males are traditionally the "breadwinners" of the
American family and the wife is usually dependent upon them. The Court here
did not agree with Congress, but rather went as far as to say that the classification
of sex is inherently suspect and should be given close judicial scrutiny. Under this
strict scrutiny test, there must be more than a rational relationship to a valid gov-
ernmental concern to uphold the law. Administrative convenience, the reason
given by the service for the differential treatment, was held by the Court not to be
a crucial interest that would justify the denial of similar treatment of men and wo-
men who are similarly situated in the service.
16. 492 U.S. 190 (1976). In Craig, the plaintiffs questioned the constitutionality
of an Oklahoma statute which allowed females over the age of 18 to purchase 3.2%
beer, but prohibited males from purchasing the beer until age 21. The Court found
that the statute discriminated against males between the ages of 18 and 20 and vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause. The state argued in favor of the law by claim-
ing its purpose was to protect the males in this category from driving while intoxi-
cated. The Court realized that the law did not further the reasons given for its
existence. The law was thus found violative of equal protection and, therefore, un-
constitutional, without the Court employing the strict standard of scrutiny given to
suspect classes.
17. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975). In this case, the plaintiff
challenged a Social Security provision due to its failure to grant benefits to a de-
ceased husband's wife and minor children while at the same time a deceased
wife's children, but not her husband, can recover. The Court ruled this to be in
violation of equal protection and called the idea that a female's earnings are not
essential to a family's livelihood "archaic and overbroad."
18. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). In Kahn, the Court held that "[a] state tax law is not
arbitrary although it 'discriminates in favor of a certain class ... if the discrimina-
tion is founded upon a reasonable distinction, or difference in state policy' not in
conflict with the Federal Constitution." Id. at 355.
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attempt to alleviate a "disproportionately heavy burden" upon
widows.19 Predictably, proponents of gender-based statutes
thereafter sought the shelter of a Kahn compensation rationale as
a justification for any statute which, though discriminatory on its
face, arguably attempted to ameliorate the disparate earning
power of women.20
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,2 1 however, a unanimous Supreme
Court rejected the Solicitor General's Kahn defense that alleviat-
ing job market discrimination was Congress' intent in formulating
Social Security "mothers' insurance benefits."22 More recently, in
Orr v. Orr,23 the Court rejected a blanket application of the Kahn
rationale. In Orr, a gender-based classification in Alabama's ali-
mony laws which limited alimony payments to wives only was
struck down. The Supreme Court reasoned that a Kahn compen-
sation justification was particularly insufficient to sustain gender-
based discrimination when a particular statute provides for indi-
vidualized hearings where financial circumstances aretaken into
consideration. The Court added:
[S]ince individualized hearings can determine which women were in fact
discriminated against vis-a-vis their husbands . . . , Alabama's alleged
compensatory purpose may be effectuated without placing burdens solely
on husbands. Progress towards fulfilling such a purpose would not be
hampered, and it would cost the state nothing more, if it were to treat men
and women equally by making alimony burdens independent of sex.2 4
19. Id. at 355.
20. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977), where the Court upheld a
provision of the Social Security Act which gave females who became 62 years old
before 1975 greater benefits than males of the same age. This was held not to vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause since the purpose was to compensate women for
past unfair treatment. See also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975). There,
the plaintiff tried to void his discharge from the Navy as unconstitutional because
he was dismissed for failure to be advanced in rank under a rule that applied to
males only. The Court did not feel the disparate treatment violated equal protec-
tion because it found a rational basis in the fact that females have traditionally
been advanced in the military at slower rates than males.
21. 420 U.S. 636. See note 17 supra.
22. The Social Security Act provision questioned in Wiesenfeld, 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(g), gives widows or surviving divorced mothers insurance benefits. See note
17 supra.
23. 440 U.S. 268 (1979). Orr involved a challenge to Alabama's gender-based al-
imony law which was struck down for violating equal protection. The statute re-
quired husbands, but not wives, to pay alimony upon divorce. The Court ruled
that classifications of gender must be scrutinized for an important governmental
concern in order to justify the differential treatment. This alimony law was not
found to be redressing women for past discrimination since Alabama provided for
hearings where the parties' financial situations were considered.
24. Id. at 281-82.
III. DISCRIMINATORY DETERMINATION OF DEPENDENCY IN
WORKERS' COMPENSATION STATUTES
As women entered the work force in record numbers in the late
1970's, no better forum to test the equal protection waters of gen-
der-based statutes had emerged than the administrative body of
law designed for the protection of the worker injured on the job.
Workers' compensation laws have been permeated since their
early twentieth century enactment with gender-based language
and classifications. The most obvious were the dependency provi-
sions, which in several jurisdictions provided a conclusive pre-
sumption of total dependency for the widow upon her husband's
compensable death, but which required a widower to prove actual
dependency, incapacity, or the like.25
Curiously, these provisions survived denouncements of gender-
based statutory provisions in both Frontiero v. Richardson and
Orr v. Orr without succumbing to legislative repeal or revision.
However, in 1976, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Di-
vision, in Passante v. Walden Printing Co.,26 struck down New
York's workers' compensation statutory presumption of depen-
dency for widows as violative of equal protection. Relying on
Frontiero and Wiesenfeld, and specifically refusing to follow the
Kahn rationale argued by the respondents, the court held that
the statute clearly discriminated against the working woman, who
as part of her employment benefits did not receive the security of
knowing that in the event of her work-related death, her widower
and family would not suffer the loss of her entire income. Rather
than being a benefit to remedy the effects of past discrimination
as in Kahn, the dependency statute was viewed by the court as
merely using past discrimination as a justification for continuing
to burden the class of working women "simply because the stat-
ute arbitrarily classifies the husband as bread-winner and conse-
quently categorizes the wife's work as unimportant." 27 Instead of
invalidating the presumption entirely, the court in Passante reme-
died the constitutional defect by extending the presumption of
dependency to widowers also.
Similarly, the following year, the Supreme Court of California
25. See note 3 supra.
26. 53 A.D.2d 8, 385 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1976). In Passante, a widower appealed a
workmens' compensation board finding that he was not dependent upon his de-
ceased wife's earnings and, therefore, was not entitled to death benefits under
New York law. The law granted death benefits to all widows, but only to those
widowers who could demonstrate their dependence upon their wives' earnings.
27. Id. at 12, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 181. The court further stated that "section 16 of
the Workmens' Compensation Law thus compels dissimilar treatment both for
surviving husbands and working wives, respectively, vis-a-vis widows and working
males. Such a sex-based differentiation cannot be sustained." Id.
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in Arp v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board28 found that the
California workers' compensation dependency presumption for
widows denied equal protection both to widowers and to em-
ployed women. Again, specifically rejecting the Kahn rationale in
the sphere of workers' compensation dependency legislation, the
court determined that the classification never had ameliorative
legislative intent. Instead, the court noted that "[t]he presump-
tion [of dependency of a widow] is the relic of an era in which the
majority of persons-certainly the majority of those in positions
of power-accepted as axiomatic that 'the God of nature made
woman frail, lovely and dependent . .. ,"29 Admonishing that
such a philosophy is clearly outmoded at a time when both mari-
tal partners are relied upon financially to combat the ravages of
inflation and spiraling costs of living, the court concluded that the
statute was neither necessary to the realization of a compelling
state goal nor justified by a fair and substantial relation to the
supposedly solicitous object of the legislation. Accordingly, in
contrast to the remedy fashioned by the New York court in Pas-
sante, the conclusive presumption was invalidated and the surviv-
ing spouse was required to show need in order to recover death
benefits.
At the same time, in New Jersey, widower-claimant Vincent
Tomarchio was challenging that state's similarly worded depen-
dency statute in Tomarchio v. Township of Greenwich.30 That
statute was declared unconstitutional by the Judge of Compensa-
tion at the outset of Tomarchio's action. Following an appeal by
the deceased worker's employer, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, on its own motion, certified the appeal of the case which
was pending in the Appellate Division. Kahn was once again dis-
tinguished as not controlling for the reason that it concerned a
state tax law, an area where states had traditionally been given
"large leeway."31 As further proof of the fact that this type of stat-
28. 19 Cal. 3d 395, 563 P.2d 849, 138 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1977). Here, a widower ap-
pealed a decision which denied him the benefit of the conclusive presumption of
total dependency afforded to widows in CAL. LAB. CODE § 3501 (West 1971).
29. Id. at 404, 563 P.2d at 854, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
30. 75 N.J. 62, 379 A.2d 848 (1977). In Tomarchio, a widower's dependency
claim for workers' compensation death benefits was denied due to failure to show
dependency upon his deceased wife's earnings.
31. Id. at 67, 379 A.2d at 852. The court also distinguished Kahn on the
grounds that Kahn found the "gender-based classification in the tax statute was
remedial, designed to rectify past discrimination visited upon women generally
435
ute could not fall into the "ameliorative" niche carved out by
Kahn, the New Jersey court pointed out that the decedent as a
wage earner had in fact been denied a benefit of her employment,
and "til t was just this kind of 'heaping additional economic disad-
vantages' upon the female wage earner which prompted the
Supreme Court's rejection" of Kahn in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld 32
and Califano v. Goldfarb.33 Pending legislative revision, the New
Jersey Supreme Court, as in Passante, extended the conclusive
presumption to widows and widowers alike.
Missouri, however, in Wengler v. Druggists' Mutual Insurance
Co.,34 failed to follow the trend set by New York, California, and
New Jersey. Although the Missouri circuit court in Wengler re-
lied upon equal protection grounds to reverse the Workers' Com-
pensation Referee's finding of no dependency, the Supreme Court
of Missouri reversed the circuit court and upheld the statute. Cit-
ing eight-year-old earning statistics and applying a rather loose-
fitting substantial relationship test, the court declined to follow
the precedent established by Passante, Arp, and Tomarchio. The
court maintained that the "substantive difference in the economic
standing of working men and women justifies the advantage that
[the dependency provision] administratively gives to a widow. ' 3"
Justice Donnelly, concurring in result, heralded imminent United
States Supreme Court-review when he pointed out that "no iden-
tifiable 'Supreme Law of the Land' exists by which we may adju-
and that its benign purpose was not a subterfuge or method for indirectly visiting
additional economic disadvantages on women." Id.
32. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). In Wiesenfeld, a wife, whose earnings as a teacher
were the principal source of support during the couple's marriage, died in child-
birth. Under 42 U.S.C. § 402, the husband received social security survivors' bene-
fits for his son, but not for himself. Social Security Act benefits based on the
earnings of a deceased husband and father covered by the Act were payable, with
some limitations, both to the widow and the couple's minor children. However,
such benefits based on the earnings of a deceased wife were only payable to the
minor children and not to the widower. The Court, relying on Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971), held that the challenged statute violated the Due Process Clause
since it provided dissimilar treatment for men and women who were similarly
situated.
33. 430 U.S. 199 (1976). In Califano, the Court held unconstitutional the re-
quirement that a widower could receive survivors' benefits only if he had been re-
ceiving at least one-half of his support from his deceased wife, whereas such
benefits based on the earnings of a deceased husband were payable to his widow
without qualification.
34. 583 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. 1979). As with the California, New York, and New
Jersey workers' compensation statutes, the Missouri law afforded a conclusive pre-
sumption of dependency for widows, but not for widowers like the plaintiff, who
were required to prove actual dependency to receive benefits.
35. Id. at 168. The Missouri Supreme Court concluded that "the widower is
not deprived of death benefits upon the compensable death of his wife but is enti-
tled to the same upon proof of dependency." Id.
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dicate a claim of alleged gender-based discrimination." 36
It was against this precedential backdrop that the United States
Supreme Court decided Wengler. Justice White, delivering the
majority opinion over a lone dissent by Justice Rehnquist, held
that such a statute discriminated against women as well as
against men who lost their employed wives in work-related acci-
dents. The Court found that the discriminatory means employed
in the statute did not substantially serve the alleged governmen-
tal objective of providing for needy spouses. The Court added
that the double-edged discrimination fostered by the Missouri
statute could be avoided and the governmental ends served just
as completely "either by paying benefits to all members of both
classes or by paying benefits only to those members of either
class who can demonstrate their need." 37
Following Wengler, the Supreme Courts of Georgia and Tennes-
see invalidated their similarly worded dependency provisions. 38
As a result of this trend, most jurisdictions' dependency statutes
today no longer allude to gender. However, six workers' compen-
sation statutes still continue to show no reported change in their
gender-based dependency provisions. 39 Wengler has additionally
been expanded to disengage the notion of romantic paternalism
in the areas of social security and bankruptcy.40
36. Id. Interestingly, it was Justice Donnelly who, after Wengler itself became
the "identifiable supreme law," on remand, accused the United States Supreme
Court of abrogating the covenant of federalism and rejoined in with Senator Moy-
nihan's query: "What do you do when the Supreme Court is wrong?" 601 S.W.2d
8, 10 (Mo. 1980).
37. 446 U.S. at 151.
38. See notes 41-42 infra and accompanying text.
39. GA. CODE ANN. § 114-414 (Supp. 1980) (the Georgia General Assembly met
after Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Russell, 246 Ga. 269,.271 S.E.2d 178 (1980), and revised
certain provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, but left the dependency pro-
vision intact); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-3-19 (Burns Supp. 1980); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 17.237(331) (Supp. 1980); Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-25 (Supp. 1980); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 77, § 562 (Purdon Supp. 1980); P.R. LAwS ANN. tit. 11, § 3(5) (Supp. 1979).
40. Mertz v. Harris, 497 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (provision of Social Se-
curity Act allowing survivors' insurance benefits to remarried widows, but not re-
married widowers, held unconstitutional); In re Crist, 632 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1980)
(section of Bankruptcy Act providing benefit of nondischargeability of debts for al-
imony and support owed to widow held unconstitutional). See also Novak v. Har-
ris, 504 F. Supp. 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
IV. THE CONCLUSIVE DEPENDENCY PRESUMPTION-
EXTENSION VS. INVALIDATION
The determination of whether the discriminatory defect should
be remedied by extending the presumption of dependency to wid-
owers, or by eliminating it for widows, was a matter which the
Supreme Court in Wengler felt would be properly left to the Mis-
souri Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the Missouri General Assem-
bly enacted legislation which extended the presumption of
dependency to widowers. Consequently, on remand, claimant
Wengler was allowed to recover benefits for the loss of his wife.
Following Wengler, two states' presumptive dependency stat-
utes for widows were invalidated. In Insurance Co. of North
America v. Russell,41 the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the
order of the superior court which had, just months before the
United States Supreme Court decision in Wengler, declared un-
constitutional the Georgia Workers' Compensation presumption
of dependency for widows. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Georgia eliminated the conclusive presumption for widows and
required a showing by either spouse of actual dependency or
need, thus following the rationale set forth in Arp.42
More recently, in Davis v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co.,43 the
same fate befell the Tennessee conclusive presumption of depen-
41. 246 Ga. 269, 271 S.E.2d 178 (1980). Following the death of his wife, which
resulted from gunshot wounds sustained during a robbery at her place of employ-
ment, the husband filed for workers' compensation benefits. However, under
Georgia law, recovery was dependent upon proof by the surviving spouse of total
or partial dependency. In contrast, the law also conclusively presumed total de-
pendency on the part of a surviving wife. The administrative law judge found that
the husband had not been partially dependent and, thus, declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the conclusive presumption regarding widows. When the su-
perior court sustained the husband's challenge to the law's constitutionality, the
deceased wife's employer and its insurer appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court.
42. By merging the offending statutory language into wording curiously sug-
gestive of a "rebuttably conclusive" presumption (the result of labeling what is ac-
tually a legislative enactment of a positive rule of substantive law as a "conclusive
presumption" dependent on proof of evidentiary facts) the court stated:
For clarity in the administration of our workers' compensation law, until
the General Assembly provides otherwise, as a result of this decision sub-
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Code § 114-414 should be read together, as fol-
lows: "The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be the
next of kin wholly dependent for support upon the deceased employee:
(a,b) A surviving spouse upon a deceased spouse if the survivor was whol-
ly or partially dependent for support upon the deceased or was in need of
such support."
246 Ga. at 273, 271 S.E.2d at 182.
43. 603 S.W.2d at 718 (Tenn. 1980). The questions presented in Davis were
(1) whether widowers were entitled to the same "conclusive presumption" of de-
pendency upon their deceased spouses as were widows, and (2) whether widow-
ers were restricted to 20% of the weekly wage of their deceased spouses as
provided by statute, as compared with 50% of the average weekly wage of de-
ceased husbands which the statute granted to widows.
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dency for widows. The widower-claimants' wives had been killed
in the armed robbery of the bank in which they worked. Not only
was the question of entitlement couched in discriminatory terms,
but the amount of the death benefit was substantially less for a
surviving dependent husband than for a widow. Applying Wen-
gler, the Supreme Court of Tennessee invalidated the statute. Af-
ter the case arose, the Tennessee legislature revised the statute
by extending the conclusive presumption, as well as the amount
of widows' benefits, to widowers.
Although more jurisdictions have chosen to extend the conclu-
sive presumption rather than to invalidate it, the approach which
appears to be more soundly based on precepts of equal protection
is that followed by California and Georgia, which requires a show-
ing of dependency or need by either spouse rather than applying
a blanket presumption.
Workers' compensation statutes are characteristically remedial
in nature and are, therefore, to be liberally construed in favor of
the claimant. Placed in this perspective, it is apparent that a bur-
den on a survivor-claimant to show some need would be relatively
easy to meet. At the same time, this would preserve the legisla-
ture's intent to provide for needy dependents of work-related cas-
ualties. Further, at least under the Georgia rationale, once some
showing of dependency or need has been made, whether partial
or total, the survivor-claimant will be deemed totally dependent
for purposes of recovery.
The point to remember is that while the legislative intent may
be to provide for needy spouses, it cannot be stated that the in-
tent is to establish state life insurance programs subsidized by
employers and workers' compensation insurance carriers irre-
spective of need. The threshold issue of entitlement to depen-
dency benefits should not hinge solely on marital status per se,
any more than it should be predicated upon gender-based dis-
crimination. Rather, entitlement to such benefits should flow
from a demonstrated need, however slight, shown by the de-
ceased worker's surviving spouse.

